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The Impact of Social Media Signals on Supplier Selection: Insights from Two 
Experiments  
 
Abstract 
Purpose: Online B2B markets offer buyers a new source of information provided by social media 
signals about suppliers. These signals have not yet received much attention in the supplier selection 
literature. This study advances our understanding of how buyers respond to social media signals in the 
supplier selection process.   
Design: We develop a choice-based conjoint experimental design to isolate and manipulate two 
signals from social media: volume (i.e. the number of ratings) and valence (i.e. average evaluation of 
the ratings). We test how these signals are interpreted in the context of varying deal sizes and price 
points.  
Findings: Both volume and valence are positively correlated with supplier selection. However, (i) the 
signals exhibit diminishing returns and (ii) the efficacy of valence is interpreted in the context of 
volume. We also find that (iii) there is no influence of the deal size and that (iv) the relationships 
between signals and supplier selection are negatively moderated by deviations from the reference 
price.  
Implications: Social media signals should be considered in supplier selection decisions as they convey 
valuable information to the buyer. However, signals go through a process of interpretation which has 
implications for buyers, suppliers, and owners of online B2B markets. 
Originality: Our research opens new lines of inquiry in behavioural operations management research 
regarding the mechanisms by which buyers interpret social media signals and how these ultimately 
influence their choice.  
Keywords: Supplier selection, B2B markets, Social media, Product reviews, eWOM, Valence, 
Volume, Signalling theory  
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1. Introduction 
The increasing dependency on a global supply network has made identification and selection of 
suitable suppliers central to the competitiveness and innovativeness of firms (Rao and Holt, 2005; 
Soosay et al., 2008). Accordingly, the supplier selection problem has received considerable attention 
in recent years (Ho et al., 2010; Wetzstein et al., 2016). Much of the research in this area tends to 
focus on identifying relevant selection criteria (e.g. quality, reliability or cost) and developing 
approaches for selecting preferred suppliers given available preference and performance information 
as well as a set of non-dominated suppliers (cf. Wetzstein et al., 2016).  
More recently, with almost 50% of all buyers searching for new suppliers online (WLW, 
2017), the emergence of online business-to-business (B2B) markets has opened new opportunities as 
well as challenges for supplier identification and selection. On the one hand, buyers can more easily 
adopt a global sourcing approach and engage with a global market of suppliers. Besides, they can also 
benefit from additional supplier-related information available from social media peer evaluations 
(Balocco et al., 2010). On the other hand, selecting suppliers in an online B2B market creates new 
challenges. Buyers now effectively deal with a much larger sample of suppliers as well as increased 
information asymmetry (Steinle et al., 2014). In an online B2B market, buyers are unable to 
physically evaluate the quality of products, to assess the trustworthiness of the supplier, or even to 
predict possible cultural barriers. Therefore, buyers need to invest additional resources to gather more 
detailed information about potential suppliers. 
In such situations, buyers rely on ‘signals’ to bridge some of the information asymmetry 
inherent in online marketplaces. Signals are “activities or attributes of individuals [suppliers] in a 
market which, by design or accident, alter the beliefs of, or convey information to, other individuals 
[buyers] in the market” (Spence 1974: 1, square brackets added). In an online B2B market, suppliers 
give out various intentional signals to buyers (e.g. certifications), but the emergence of unintentional 
social media signals generated by other buyers also promises to be a useful source of additional 
information for the supplier selection process. Often called electronic word of mouth (eWOM) in the 
marketing literature, these social media signals have two main characteristics: volume, which is the 
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amount of social media feedback from existing buyers (i.e. the number of ratings), and valence, which 
is the sentiment of the social media feedback (i.e. average evaluation of the ratings) (cf. Floyd et al., 
2014). These two social media signals have been found to impact sales in business-to-consumer 
(B2C) markets, but their respective influence is dependent on several contingency factors (Babić 
Rosario et al., 2016). Furthermore, as discussed in more detail later, there are some key difference in 
what drives supplier selection decisions in B2B markets compared consumer choices in a B2C 
markets. Most notably in B2C markets, consumers are heavily influenced by the brand of the product 
(Ho-Dac et al., 2013), whereas organisational buyers are much less concerned with the brand, instead 
they pay more attention to the importance and complexity of the purchase (Luzzini et al., 2012). Their 
supplier selection decisions are therefore more likely affected by financial considerations such as deal 
size and price (Brown et al., 2011). 
In response to the Special Issue call (Cheng et al., 2019), this study therefore aims to answer 
the following questions: How are organisational buyers influenced by unintentional signals generated 
from social media, specifically (i) the number of ratings indicating volume and (ii) the average rating 
indicating valence – when scanning for suppliers in online B2B markets? How do different 
purchasing scenarios, such as deal size and product price, interact with social media signals to 
influence supplier selection? Given the increasing importance of online B2B markets for identifying 
suitable suppliers and efficiently handling purchase processes, this paper contributes to supplier 
selection research by exploring the role of social media signals in reducing information asymmetry in 
online B2B markets. We also contribute to behavioural research in operations management by 
opening new lines of inquiry into the mechanisms through which buyers interpret social media signals 
and how these ultimately influence their choice (Tokar, 2010). Our findings provide valuable insights 
for buyers, suppliers and market owners. 
In the following sections, we review the current research on supplier selection, signalling 
theory, and the use of social media in B2B markets and develop testable hypotheses about the 
influence of social media signals on buyers. Next, we describe our experimental set-up, data, and 
present our findings. In the final sections, we discuss our findings in the light of implications for 
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research on the use of social media in online B2B markets as well as implications for practitioners – 
suppliers, buyers, and market owners and close with conclusions and limitations.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Supplier selection process and criteria 
The supplier selection process has received considerable attention in past years (Ho et al., 2010; 
Wetzstein et al., 2016). This process typically includes the identification of needs and specifications 
that can be translated into a set of criteria used to evaluate, monitor and develop suppliers that have 
been identified through supply market research and/or RFX (Request for 
Information/Proposal/Quote). Following an initial assessment and qualification, short-listed suppliers 
undergo a more detailed evaluation before being potentially selected as actual supplier (Zimmer et al., 
2016). A large share of the supplier selection research has focussed on identifying relevant selection 
criteria and on developing quantitative approaches for selecting preferred supplier(s) given some 
preference and supplier information as well as the set of non-dominated suppliers along the 
conflicting criteria (Wetzstein et al., 2016). Many different selection criteria have been proposed in 
the literature, including quality, delivery speed and dependability as well as cost (Ho et al., 2010). 
More recently, some studies have also focussed on economic and environmental sustainability criteria 
even though social sustainability has largely been overlooked (Zimmer et al., 2016). Another criterion 
that has been overlooked till date is the availability of information about a supplier from other buyers 
as provided by social media.  This aspect, however, is of particular interest as supplier selection 
decisions are influenced by the decision maker’s perception of uncertainty and available signals (Kull 
et al., 2014). 
2.2 Signalling theory in B2B markets 
Signalling theory proposes that to alleviate some of the risk and uncertainty of dealing with unknown 
sellers, buyers will screen sellers using observable, useful, and trustworthy signals. First, these signals 
must be clearly observable. In online B2B markets, suppliers prominently display intended signals 
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like certifications, guarantees, and selected customer testimonials, as well as unintended signals that 
they do not fully control such as ‘top supplier ranking’ or social media feedback. Second, these 
attributes are useful for buyers – albeit the attributes convey specific information about the supplier 
that may or may not be equally important for all buyers. For instance, a sustainability certification that 
a supplier displays on their profile may not be important for some buyers in selecting suppliers. 
Finally, for the signals to be credible and create a useful separation between suppliers that have the 
attribute and suppliers that do not, they must be trustworthy and costly. For instance, everything else 
remaining equal, a supplier with a reputable quality certification is more likely to have better quality 
than a supplier without any certification. However, different receivers can view or ‘calibrate’ the same 
signal differently and therefore these signals go through a process of interpretation into perceived 
meaning by buyers (Branzei et al., 2004). For sellers in online B2B markets, this implies that they 
should generate multiple signals to convince potential buyers of their credibility.  
Intentional signals: A common approach for sellers is to generate multiple signals intentionally by 
acquiring different certifications. For instance, an intentional signal for quality is the quality 
certification ISO 9000 that meets all the criteria set out by signalling theory (Connelly et al., 2011). 
Similarly, suppliers can join industry initiatives to signal their commitment to common guidelines for 
social, environmental or economic practices and sharing related information. The intermediary Sedex, 
for instance “helps buyers and suppliers to share and exchange data, helping to better manage social 
and environmental risks within their supply chain, and positively impact responsible sourcing” 
(Sedex, 2019). Suppliers can also generate intentional signals by introducing trade policies that lower 
the risk for buyers. For instance, a supplier can offer ‘Trade Assurance’ – an increasingly popular 
assurance that lesser known suppliers offer to overcome trust issues. Finally, a supplier can also 
generate intentional signals by prominently highlighting customer testimonials – especially from well-
known customers. In all these instances of intentional signalling, the supplier is in control on whether 
to provide these signals or not.  
Unintentional signals: There are also unintentional signals that are not fully under the supplier’s 
control. One such unintentional signal is the feedback generated about the supplier on social media. 
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Most online B2B markets follow-up with buyers to leave feedback for suppliers. This feedback is 
usually in the form of ratings on various attributes of the supplier on a five-point scale and a free text 
section. The online B2B market then aggregates the feedback into two main metrics: the number of 
ratings that indicates volume (i.e. the number of buyers who have given feedback) and the average 
rating that indicates valence (i.e. the sentiment of the feedback). This social media feedback is 
prominently displayed on the supplier’s profile and importantly, the supplier cannot remove it if it 
turns unfavourable. Signals generated from social media ratings also meet all the criteria set out by 
signalling theory. First, these aggregated ratings are prominently displayed on the profile page of the 
supplier. Second, they are useful as they help future buyers understand the satisfaction of past buyers 
dealing the supplier as well as estimate the popularity of the supplier. And finally, they are costly to 
produce because the supplier must meet the buyer’s expectations to be able to achieve a good rating.  
 Online communication between current and potential customers (also labelled as eWOM) has 
become an important area of research for marketing scholars. There are several recently published 
review papers that summarize the marketing literature to date and highlight the influence of customer 
reviews on future sales (Babić Rosario et al., 2016; Purnawirawan et al., 2015). The most recent meta-
analysis by Babić Rosario et al. (2016) found that across 96 studies conducted in a B2C context, 
eWOM is consistently linked to increased sales, particularly in the context of e-commerce platforms. 
Overall, this effect is driven more strongly by eWOM volume than eWOM valence, however, the 
authors note that the combined effect of eWOM volume and valence on consumer behaviour is 
complex. For example, Khare, Labrecque and Asare (2011) study the volume effect in the context of 
consumers’ movie choices. The volume effect posits that a high volume of reviews accentuates the 
effect of review valence so that a higher volume of negative reviews has a stronger negative effect and 
a higher volume of positive reviews has a stronger positive effect than a low volume. While this 
stream of research is useful for our analysis of signals in B2B markets, especially in interpreting our 
results, there are several important differences between signalling in B2B markets compared to B2C 
markets that are worth highlighting. 
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Differences in signalling in B2B v B2C markets: In general, communication in B2B markets involves 
sellers (suppliers) attempting to communicate relatively complex ideas to specialized and smaller 
audiences (buyers), while in B2C markets, the seller typically communicates relatively simple ideas to 
large audiences. Therefore, sellers in these two types of markets tend to choose different signals to 
communicate with their audiences. In the case of screening B2B markets, the seller’s brand or 
company is likely to be unknown to the buyer, therefore the seller is likely to rely on acquiring 
specialized and better-known certifications (e.g. ISO 9000) to appeal to a target segment, whereas in 
B2C markets the seller is more likely to highlight or build on its own brand as a differentiator. An 
important distinction between these two signals is that the same certification can be acquired by more 
than one supplier in B2B markets – but brands in B2C markets would always be distinct and remain a 
key identifier for an individual supplier. Brands in B2C markets not only act as a signal in themselves, 
but they also impact how consumers respond to unintentional signals, such as social media reviews. 
Mafael, Gottschalk and Kreis (2016) have found that brand attitude is indeed very important in 
determining how consumers process eWOM information, so that if they have a positive attitude 
towards the brand, they find positive arguments in an eWOM review more persuasive and negative 
arguments less persuasive than if they have a negative attitude towards the brand. Such biased 
information processing of social media signals would be less likely to occur in B2B markets.  
 The transaction value in these markets is also substantially different. Buyers in B2B markets 
typically engage in much higher value transactions – therefore both the trading risk and value 
appropriation risk are much higher compared to B2C transactions (Lanzolla and Frankort, 2016). 
Furthermore, as buyers in B2B markets are not buying for their personal consumption but they are 
buying for their firm, they are more likely to keep personal tastes aside and pay greater attention to 
both intentional and unintentional signals. For instance, they are more likely to follow a process or 
‘checklist’ for choosing suppliers that may consist of checking for minimum quality certifications, 
trade assurances, or even size of the business to estimate long-term viability. In a similar vein, buyer’s 
individual differences (e.g., need for uniqueness, Khare et al., 2011) will play less of a role in B2B 
buying decisions because the buyer is purchasing on behalf of the company and not to enhance his/her 
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own identity. Buyers in B2B markets are therefore expected to be more objective in their 
interpretation of social media signals and less likely to be influenced by idiosyncratic preferences 
when buying for their business. 
 Finally, there are differences in the type of social media communication common in B2B 
compared to B2C markets (Swani et al., 2014). In addition to the numerical five-point feedback, 
consumers in B2C markets are more likely to leave text-based feedback in the form of online reviews. 
In contrast, buyers in B2B are not as likely to take the time to leave text-based feedback. Consulting 
companies that provide advisory services in this area argue that this is because the text-based 
feedback is usually not anonymous and therefore buyers do not want to give negative feedback that 
could hurt their professional relationship with the supplier (see for example Koble, 2018; StratoServe, 
2019). This behaviour makes the communication between current and future buyers more focused on 
numerical social media feedback that is displayed on the seller’s profile. 
Importance of social media signals in B2B markets: As many suppliers acquire the same intentional 
signals, buyers are likely to pay a lot of attention to unintentional signals to narrow down their search. 
One such signal is the aggregated social media ratings (i.e. volume and valence of ratings) generated 
by other buyers. Clearly, when a supplier has both high volume and valence, this combination 
becomes a dominant signal – but what happens when either volume or valence is low? We know from 
the B2C literature that generally, volume tends to influence the interpretation of valence (Babić 
Rosario et al., 2016), but we do not know how these two signals are traded off, especially in cases in 
which volume does not yet dominate. Therefore, the key question is: When sellers have similar 
characteristics and the same intentional signals, how do buyers interpret the signal generated from 
differences in volume and valence of ratings? Our intent is to understand how changes in these signals 
generated by social media influence the chances of a supplier getting selected in the context of 
different deal sizes and reference prices. This is particularly important for suppliers who have a low 
transaction volume and thus by extension less opportunity to receive a high volume of ratings, and for 
new suppliers who have not yet had enough time to generate a high volume of ratings. Understanding 
the pay offs for increasing volume or valence of ratings can help guide suppliers’ social media 
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strategy in online B2B markets. In addition, this understanding is also important for buyers to 
effectively integrate social media signals into their supplier selection processes, and for online market 
owners to govern the flow of information between suppliers and buyers. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
3.1 Diminishing returns 
Based on signalling theory (Spence, 1974, 2002), we have argued that since the quality of unknown 
suppliers cannot be directly observed, buyers would aim to reduce the information asymmetry and 
rely on information signals that are thought to correlate with quality of the supplier. In online B2B 
marketplaces, volume and valence of buyer ratings convey such signals. Volume indicates the number 
of buyers that have previously engaged that supplier – so higher volume indicates that the supplier is 
more popular. Valence indicates the average satisfaction of previous buyers with that supplier – so 
higher valence indicates greater satisfaction with that supplier. Therefore, in line with signalling 
theory we expect that the likelihood of selecting a supplier is directly linked to volume and valence 
signals of that supplier. 
Since volume and valence signals serve as approximations of the quality of the supplier, 
buyers are indeed likely to be sensitive towards more information to improve the accuracy and 
validity of the signals (Aydinoğlu and Krishna, 2011, Drover et al., 2018). However, we do not expect 
this relationship to be linear as buyers are likely to benefit more from changes in the signal at the 
lower end compared to the higher end of these signals. For example, 10 additional reviews are more 
useful for the buyer’s assessment of the signal’s strength when volume is 25, compared to when 
volume is 250. Griffin et al. (2004) propose a cognitive model of information sufficiency in decision-
making that is useful in understanding the basis of these differences in signal interpretation. They 
argue that individual decision-makers have a desired level of judgement-confidence: the strength of a 
signal that would be deemed satisfactory in making a decision with a certain level of accuracy and 
validity. Therefore, for individual decision-makers, an increase in signal strength at the lower end is 
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more useful till it attains the desired level of judgement-confidence, compared to an increase in signal 
strength at the higher end – after it has surpassed their judgement-confidence.  
This stream of research points out that every individual has an idiosyncratic threshold level of 
judgement-confidence, but it is estimated to be consistent for a person (Drover et al., 2018). As the 
signal increases in value, more respondents will cross their own threshold level of judgement-
confidence and increasingly, the positive influence of the signal on decision-makers would diminish. 
Therefore, we hypothesise that the positive influence of volume and valence on buyers has 
diminishing returns as more buyers cross their threshold judgement-confidence. 
H1: The positive influence of signals from volume and valence of social media has 
diminishing returns. 
3.2 Supremacy effect of volume over valence 
When evaluating suppliers, buyers take into account a combination of both signals. This evaluation is 
easy when both volume and valence are high or when both are low. However, in situations when the 
two signals oppose each other, it is not clear which signal is more effective in influencing buyers’ 
decisions. To understand this question, we consider buyers’ preferences towards two opposing 
supplier profiles: when one of the signals is high while the other is low, and vice versa.  
 We know that while valence is a signal of average satisfaction of previous buyers, volume 
enables future buyers to qualify and interpret the accuracy of this valence signal (Khare et al., 2011). 
Put differently, a buyer would have greater uncertainty in assessing the true satisfaction level with a 
supplier that has received high valence and low volume ratings compared to a supplier with low 
valence and high-volume ratings– even though the mean valence may be lower for the latter supplier. 
In these situations, buyers are likely to select a supplier with lower uncertainty when they are making 
purchasing decisions. The link between decreasing uncertainty with increasing volume has its roots in 
the ‘wisdom of the crowd effect’: the statistical observation that assessment of a large number of 
people can indeed be close to the true representation (Prelec et al., 2017). While decision-makers are 
aware that preferences of single buyers may vary, the aggregation of numerous buyers is likely to 
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nullify both positive and negative variation to generate a more accurate estimate (Lorenz et al, 2011). 
In essence, buyers interpret the accuracy of valence based on their assessment of what they would 
consider a suitably large sample (Babić Rosario et al., 2016). Therefore, we hypothesise: 
H2: Both opposing signal combinations, i.e. high volume with low valence and low volume 
with high valence, negatively influence the buyer’s decision compared to a base combination; 
but the combination of low volume with high valence has a stronger negative influence than 
the combination of high volume with low valence. 
3.3 Sensitivity of social media signals to deal size 
Prior research indicates that organizational buyers are sensitive to risk (Brown et al., 2011). 
Therefore, their interpretation of social media signals is likely to be influenced by the size of the deal 
as buyers’ assessment of expected loss is dependent on the probability of a loss and its significance: 
expected loss = risk of loss * value of the deal (Mitchell, 1995). A larger deal size indicates higher 
expected losses from the risk of an unsatisfactory outcome as compared to a smaller sized deal.  
Prospect theory is useful in understanding the behaviour of buyers as the deal size changes. 
The central idea of loss aversion in decision making suggests that faced with a risky choice that can 
lead to losses, individuals are more likely to seek options that avoid losses even if these options have 
lower utility (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Therefore, buyers are likely to be more sensitive to 
volume and valence signals when considering a larger deal. Put differently, they are more likely to 
favour higher volume and valence as it indicates relatively less risk in a large deal size purchasing 
decision compared to a small deal size purchase decision. In the same vein, buyers are more likely to 
more strongly disfavour lower volume and valence in a large deal situation as it indicates greater 
potential impact. Therefore, we expect that the size of the deal will positively moderate the influence 
of volume and valence signals on supplier selection decisions.   
H3: Deal size will positively moderate the influence of volume and valence signals. 
 3.4 Sensitivity of social media signals to reference price 
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Another important factor that could influence the interpretation of social media signals is price 
because buyers in online marketplaces have to balance finding the best possible product with their 
available budgets. Extant literature shows that buyers are heavily influenced by reference prices: an 
internal price standard that buyers would deem suitable for the goods or service in question (Monroe, 
1973). Reference prices are formed from prior experience of purchasing similar goods or services, or 
by comparing similar products in the market (Mazumdar et al., 2005).  Drawing upon research on 
decision making under risk and uncertainty, scholars studying purchasing in B2B markets have 
proposed that a price that is close to the reference price indicates an expected price for the buyer. If 
the price offered by a supplier is above the reference price, the buyer is at ‘loss’ and if the price 
offered by the supplier is lower than the reference price then the buyer is at ‘gain’ (Bruno et al., 
2012). This suggests that the way buyers interpret social media signals when the price is within their 
reference price expectations would be different from when the price is higher or lower than the 
reference price.  
When the price is above the reference price, buyers sense a loss scenario – unless the price 
premium indicates superior quality. However, due to the inherent risk in social media signals, buyers 
are more likely to downplay the signals and avoid the higher price option. Prior research on 
subcontractor choices provides further insights into buyers’ loss aversion behaviour. For instance, 
Biong (2013) shows that due to the inherent risks involved in assessing reputation signals, buyers are 
unwilling to pay a price premium for subcontractors even when they have a better reputation. This 
indicates that the efficacy of the social media signals would reduce as the supplier’s price goes above 
the reference price. Conversely, when the supplier’s price is below the reference price, buyers 
perceive a gain scenario and are more likely to select this option. Their mindset will shift from loss 
aversion to gain seeking, which implies that decision-makers are motivated by goals to pursue gains 
and are therefore likely to take risks to pursue their goals (Rhee and Fiss, 2014). In a gain seeking 
mindset, buyers underplay the efficacy of social media signals in favour of the gains from a lower 
price. Therefore, we would expect that price below the reference price would also negatively 
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moderate the relationship between social media signals and supplier selection. Put together, we 
expect:        
H4: Lower and higher price, compared to a reference price, negatively moderates the 
influence of volume and valence signals on supplier selection. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Experimental design 
Experimental research designs to understand decision-makers’ behavioural preferences are becoming 
more common in operations management (see for example Deck and Smith, 2013; Petropoulos et al., 
2018). To test our hypotheses, we develop a Choice-Based Conjoint (CBC) experimental design. CBC 
is an appropriate design for two main reasons. First, as Levitt and List (2007: 153) mention, 
experimental designs in general and CBC in particular “provide ceteris paribus observations of 
individual economic agents, which are otherwise difficult to obtain”. By fully embracing the 
controlled environment of the experimental set-up, we can isolate and regulate the levels and 
attributes of interest, keeping everything else equal. Second, CBC provides insights into decision-
makers’ behaviours and preferences towards, and trade-offs between, different attributes. Such a 
design therefore allows us to estimate how these preferences are likely to change with varying levels 
of the different attributes (Orme, 2010).  
We follow the directions of Rao (2014) in setting up a CBC experimental design. Table 1 
shows the attributes and levels we used to design the two experiments we conducted. To identify 
suitable levels of volume and valence, we browsed through three commonly used online B2B markets 
(Alibaba, Amazon B2B, and GlobalSources). We found that valence typically starts from 3.5/5.0 and 
can be as high as 5.0/5.0. We decided to restrict our valence levels from 3.5 to 4.5, as valence above 
4.5 represents a dominantly positive signal. Thus, we set the levels of valence as 3.5, 3.7, 3.9, 4.1, 4.3 
and 4.5. We found that volume can also vary significantly from less than 10 to over 500, therefore, we 
selected the volume levels as 10, 25, 50, 100, 250, 500. We decided not to have a linear scale for 
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volume as we wanted to cover a broader range while having more levels at the lower end of the 
spectrum.  
These attributes and levels were then used to generate orthogonal choice sets with four 
options in each choice scenario and twelve choice scenarios per respondent. The orthogonal choice 
sets were created using the CBC design and analysis software Sawtooth. In every choice scenario, the 
respondent was asked to select the most preferred supplier from four non-dominant options. Each 
respondent was asked a set of demographic questions as well as an attention check question after 
completing the CBC questions. Respondents were also asked to leave an open-ended text-based 
response explaining their decision rules for selecting a supplier. Our chosen purchasing context is that 
of a buyer seeking a supplier of 3D printers. This is a suitable context as the product is not sector-
specific, presents an adequate level of complexity while still being comprehensible, and provides us 
the scope to create a variety of purchasing scenarios varying price and deal size.          
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 1 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted two experiments. In experiment 1, respondents were asked 
to trade off volume and valence signals only. In this experiment, we manipulated deal size using two 
conditions (i) Select a supplier to buy one 3D printer with a budget of £2,000 and (ii) Select a supplier 
to buy fifty 3D printers with a budget of £100,000. Respondents were randomly assigned to either 
condition. In experiment 2, we added price as an additional attribute, and respondents were asked to 
trade-off volume, valence, and price. In this experiment, we set a reference price zone for the 
respondents as it is common for purchasing manages to have such knowledge. Respondents were 
informed that “From experience, you know that a 3D printer of your specification typically costs 
between £1,500 and £2,500”. We manipulated price using three levels: (i) £ 1,000, i.e. below the 
reference price, (ii) £ 2,000, at the midpoint of the reference price, and (iii) £ 3,000, above the 
reference price.    
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4.2 Participants 
Participants for the CBC were identified using the Prolific online survey platform, a community that 
is commonly used by researchers to run specialized surveys. We used a two-step process to ensure 
high quality respondents. First, we created a pre-screening survey to identify a sample of 750 
respondents with prior B2B purchasing experience. Second, these respondents with prior purchasing 
experience were invited to complete the full CBC experiment online. Each respondent was paid £2.00 
to complete the survey. Of the 750 eligible participants, 592 completed one of the experiments. We 
eliminated 83 respondents who did not pass the attention checks. In total, there were 371 valid 
respondents in experiment 1 (condition 1: n=192; condition 2: n=179) and 138 valid respondents in 
experiment 2. Table 2 provides descriptive details of the final valid sample – especially with regards 
to purchasing experience of the participants. From table 2, we see that our samples for each 
experiment and the two conditions of experiment 1 are well balanced. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 2 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
5. Findings 
5.1 Descriptive observations  
To understand how buyers interpret signals, we start with a part-worth utility analysis and the relative 
importance of attributes. This analysis was done using Sawtooth Software’s part-worth utilities and 
relative importance analysis package. Similar analytical techniques are common for CBC designs in a 
variety of fields, including operation management, and are useful to understand the utilities of the 
attributes at different levels (Venkatesh et al., 2012). Part-worth utilities are numerical scores that 
measure how much each attribute and level influenced the buyer’s decision to make that choice (Hair 
et al., 2013). Part-worths are scaled to an arbitrary additive constant within each attribute so that the 
sum of the utilities is zero for that attribute. The marginal utility indicates the change in part-worths 
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per unit change in the levels. The relative importance measure indicates what difference each attribute 
makes regarding the total utility of a product. The percentages are calculated to obtain a set of 
attribute importance values that add to 100 percent.   
 Table 3 displays the part-worth utilities and relative importance of each attribute and level. 
There are three main takeaways from Table 3. First, we can observe that the marginal utilities for both 
volume and valence decrease at higher levels of these attributes. For instance, the marginal utility for 
unit changes in volume is between 0.43 and 0.47 when volume changes from 50 to 100 across all the 
experimental designs, but it is only between 0.04 and 0.05 for volume changes from 250 to 500. We 
observe a similar pattern for valence: the marginal utility from increasing valence at higher levels is 
lower. An analysis of the marginal utility for valence shows that the marginal utility is highest when 
valence increases from 3.9 to 4.1 across all the experimental designs, indicating that buyers are 
particularly sensitive to the transition from 3.9 to 4.1 as a benchmark. However, there is a sharp fall in 
the marginal utility after 4.1. Second, we find that the deal size has little impact on the utilities and 
relative importance of volume and valence signals. Third, we find that even though volume is 
relatively more important than valence in the two instances of experiment 1 (Volume 52% v. Valence 
48%); upon introducing price as a third attribute in experiment 2, valence becomes relatively more 
important than volume (Volume 33% v. Valence 38%). This indicates that when the same product is 
offered at higher or lower prices, buyers are likely to compromise on volume signals more than they 
are willing to compromise on valence signals.  
Data obtained from CBC experimental designs can also be used to run sensitivity analyses to 
reveal how the share of preference of a supplier (vis-à-vis other suppliers) changes by changing 
attribute levels one at a time. As Orme (2010: 81) points out “in this way, the impact of each attribute 
level is estimated within the specific and appropriate context of the competitive landscape.” We used 
Sawtooth Software’s market simulator package to simulate the changing share of preference for a 
supplier (Supplier 1) while keeping characterises of the competitor (Supplier 2) constant. While 
sensitivity analysis can be done for any combination of suppliers, we decided to run the simulation 
with an established, non-dominant competitor (Supplier 2) with fixed characteristics Vol = 250, Val = 
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3.9, Price = £2,000. Figure 1 shows the changing share of preference of a supplier (Supplier 1) at 
different levels of volume and valence. From this analysis we can observe that there are diminishing 
returns for Supplier 1 at higher levels of volume and valence. We can also see that the threshold is 
between 50 and 100 for volume and between 3.9 and 4.1 for valence. This is in line with the text-
based comments from our respondents. For example, a respondent mentioned “I assumed that after 
100 ratings the average rating wouldn't change significantly so I looked for products with 100+ 
ratings.” Another described their decision-making criterion as “I tried to find a balance between 
sufficient reviews (preferably more than 50) and a sufficient rating (where possible above or close to 
4.0) as this would indicate a generally good performance experience.” The regression analyses 
provide further insights into these findings.  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 3 & figure 1 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
5.2 Hypothesis testing: Regression analyses 
CBC designs enables us to create utility functions for each respondent, that can be used to predict the 
chances of a respondent selecting one supplier over another, given different supplier characteristics. 
To understand how this preference changes with changing levels of volume, valence, and price, we 
created a ‘base option’ supplier with the following characteristics: Vol = 75, Val = 4.0, and Price = £ 
2,000. These base option characteristics were informed by the observations from the descriptive 
analysis that a buyer’s threshold is likely to be between Vol: 50 and 100, Val: 3.9 and 4.1, and at the 
midpoint of the reference price i.e. £2,000. Then, using the utility function of each respondent, we 
estimated if the respondent would select an alternate, non-dominant supplier over the base option. 
This technique allows us to model how the probability of selecting an alternate supplier over the base 
option supplier changes with changing levels of the signals. Table 4 shows the results of the logistic 
regression model with the dependent variable as ‘Selecting the alternate supplier over the base option 
supplier’.    
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Model 1 shows that both volume (0.047, p<0.001) and valence (0.273, p<0.001) are 
positively and significantly correlated with the chances of the alternate supplier being selected over 
the base option supplier, as expected. In model 2, we introduce the quadratic terms for volume (-
0.004, p<0.001) and valence (-0.041, p<0.001) to investigate if this positive effect levels off as 
volume and valence increase. We find that the quadratic terms have negative and significant 
coefficients. This indicates diminishing returns of volume and valence on the chances of the alternate 
supplier being selected over the base option supplier with increasing levels of volume and valence. 
Thus, we find evidence in support for H1.  
Model 3 introduces two dummy variables for the two opposing signal combinations; 
specifically (i) high volume (500) with low valence (3.5) and (ii) low volume (10) with high valence 
(4.5). We find that in both instances, the probability of the alternate supplier being chosen over the 
base option is lower – but the effect is more pronounced for low volume and high valence. 
Furthermore, using Sawtooth’s market simulator package, we ran a simulation to understand 
respondents’ relative preference for each option: Option A (Vol = 500 and Val = 3.5) v. Option B 
(Vol = 10 and Val = 4.5). Our results indicate that 55.8% of our respondents would select option A 
over option B thus preferring an option with significantly lower valence if the volume is higher. These 
findings provide evidence to support H2.  
Model 4 introduces deal size as a moderating variable. Contrary to our expectations, we find 
that a large deal size does not have any significant influence on the probability of the alternate option 
being selected, neither does deal size have a moderating effect on volume and valence. Thus, we do 
not find support for H3. In the discussion section, we propose potential explanations for this 
unexpected finding.  
Model 5 reports the effect of price on the probability of an alternate supplier being selected 
over the base option supplier. We find that both volume and valence have a significant positive 
impact. A price point of £1,000, lower than the reference price, has a positive effect (4.536, p<0.001) 
on the chances of the alternate option being selected, but the coefficient for the higher price point of 
£3,000 is not significant. Furthermore, we find that both the lower and higher price points negatively 
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moderate the impact of volume and valence on supplier selection. This indicates that respondents are 
most sensitive to volume and valence signals when the price is within their reference price zone. This 
provides supporting evidence for H4. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 4 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
5.3 Further analysis to assess trade-offs for new suppliers   
Sensitivity analysis using CBC experimental data enables us to understand trade-offs for suppliers 
with specific profiles in different competitive settings. While this analysis can be done for various 
combinations, studying the prospects of a new entrant (Supplier 1) that has yet to build up their online 
reputation is useful as prior research indicates that new suppliers often find it difficult to establish 
themselves in B2B markets (Rottenburger and Kaufmann, 2019). Therefore, we study the share of 
preference of a new entrant with changes in its volume, valence, and price vis-à-vis an established 
competitor (Supplier 2). As the supplier 2 is likely to have higher volume and a price within the 
reference price zone, we decided to run the sensitivity analysis with competitors at different levels of 
valence. Figure 2 (a) (b) and (c) shows the sensitivity analysis of new supplier (Supplier 1) with 
characteristics Vol = 10, Val = 3.9, Price = £ 2,000, against three different established competitors 
with different levels of valence. From figure 2(a) we can once again observe the diminishing returns 
for volume. In figure 2(b) we can clearly observe the threshold effect between 3.9 and 4.1 for 
suppliers 2A and 2B, but against the strongest supplier 2C, which has a valence of 4.1, we do not 
observe a threshold – thus further indicating that valence is interpreted in the context of volume. 
Finally, from figure 2(c), we find that buyers avoid high price options and tend to prefer lower priced 
options regardless of the social media signals. This was also echoed in the respondents’ comments. 
For instance, one respondent started explaining their logic as “Having ruled out any over my budget, 
which I set at the top end of the typical price range…”. Another summarised their price logic as “I 
aimed to stick within the price range, for the best rating with the largest number of ratings”.  
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 ------------------------------------------------ 
Insert figure 2 (a) (b) (c) here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
6. Discussion 
Research indicates that to overcome some of the information asymmetry in B2B markets, buyers are 
likely to rely on signals that are either generated by the supplier – intentional signals, or by the market 
– unintentional signals, to shortlist and engage with suppliers in online B2B markets (Lanzolla and 
Frankort, 2016). As many suppliers provide the same intentional signals, studying how buyers are 
influenced by unintentional signals such as those generated by social media feedback presents both 
theoretical and practical relevance. 
6.1 Implications for research 
We believe our research opens new lines of inquiry in behavioural operations management research, 
especially regarding the mechanisms by which buyers interpret social media signals and how these 
ultimately influence their choice (Tokar, 2010).  
Buyer’s interpretation of social media signals and its impact: Research on signalling in B2C as well as 
B2B markets has predominantly considered the use of intentional signals (such as certifications) – 
taking the seller’s perspective as a signaller and not the perspective of the buyer. Our research aims to 
address this gap. We explore the trade-offs that buyers have to consider when choosing between 
different suppliers that offer different configurations of social media signals. Furthermore, we take 
into account how the interpretation of these signals changes in different pricing contexts (Connelly et 
al., 2011).  
First, taking the buyer’s perspective, we show that unintended signals from social media 
ratings influence a buyer’s choices. But unlike some objective intentional signals such as 
certifications, there is heterogeneity in buyers’ interpretation of social media signals. Therefore, a 
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probabilistic rather than deterministic treatment of unintentional signals would be prudent at the 
aggregated level (Banerjee et al., 2019). Our theoretical argument for diminishing returns for both 
volume and valence of social media signals provides an explanation for the possible mechanism 
underlying this shift in aggregated buyer behaviour. Specifically, as more individual buyers cross their 
idiosyncratic threshold for sufficient valence and volume, the observed aggregated effect at the 
macro-level would show diminishing returns. This highlights the need to further investigate 
judgement-confidence levels of respondents towards social media signals. Our sample of respondents 
seem to indicate that buyers have a threshold volume between 50 and 100 reviews and valence of 
4.0/5.0.  
Second, we did not find empirical evidence to show any moderating effect of the deal size on 
the efficacy of social media signals although profit impact, often measured by the purchasing volume, 
is considered an important criteria for developing effective purchasing strategies (cf. Kraljic, 1983; 
Luzzini et al., 2012). This seems to indicate that buyers are not sensitive to deal size and do not seem 
to perceive a higher importance for purchases with larger deal sizes as long as the unit price of the 
product is the same. This could be for two reasons. First, buyers may be selecting the supplier 
independently of the deal size, as the influence of the deal size comes into consideration only later in 
the purchasing process. Second, buyers may not consider numeric social media signals useful in 
assessing the strategic importance of a purchase in terms of its impact on product quality and business 
growth. Therefore, deal size has no significant influence on the efficacy of numeric social media 
signals. It is possible that text-based social media feedback in which previous buyers explain their 
reasons for giving a specific numeric rating would add more information on profit impact, but 
numeric social media signals alone do not seem to convey sufficient information on such complex 
matters.  
Finally, research shows that buyers, like most decision-makers, are sensitive to reference 
points when interpreting information (Thaler 1985; Qualls and Puto 1989). Our research shows this to 
be the case when buyers interpret social media signals in the context of price references. We find that 
buyers pay more attention to social media signals when the price is within their reference price zone. 
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In this case, price is not diagnostic and thus buyers can focus on additional signals such as social 
media signals for further information. However, if price falls outside of the reference zone, it gains 
diagnostic value as a signal in itself and weakens the importance of social media signals. These 
findings further indicate possible heterogeneity in signal interpretation in the context of pricing. 
Trust in social media signals: Trustworthiness, how it is developed and maintained, has been a 
concern for management researchers across disciplines (Yu et. al, 2015). The natural question that 
follows is to what extent buyers consider the signals generated from social media to be trustworthy. 
Insights from our discussion of the results combined with evidence from the B2C literature present 
new lines of inquiry (Babić Rosario et al., 2016). Not surprisingly, the participants mentioned that 
they are more likely to trust the signal as volume increases – indicating a tendency to have faith in 
large numbers and the “wisdom of the crowd” (Racherla et al., 2012). As a respondent commented 
“Star rating was important but only when there were a decent number of reviews to show that the 
score was a true representation” and several respondents mention “ [...] the most important part of the 
decision was to have at least 100 ratings”. This indicates that high volume can induce trust.  
Threshold valence can also be a source of trust. Previous research in B2C contexts have 
shown that a positive first reviews can influence trust (Park et al., 2018). However, if the initial 
review is negative, this can potentially set in motion a downward spiral – reducing the possibility of 
getting more buyers and generating additional (more positive) reviews to even out that negative rating 
over time. Park et al. (2018) find that the effect of the first review can still be felt three years later. 
This implies that buyers are particularly sensitive to the valence of the first review, and increasingly 
they trust a larger volume of reviews. Our data shows that buyers do trade off higher volume for lower 
valence. As a respondent points out suppliers “[…] had to have above 4 rating. If the ratings are close, 
higher number of ratings are preferred, even if the rating is lower.” 
6.2 Implications for practice 
The observations from our data reveal useful insights for practitioners that we have grouped under 
implications for suppliers, buyers, and market owners.     
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Implications for a supplier’s strategy: Suppliers do not have direct control over the ratings left by 
buyers in the online market, however they do have some options to influence what kind of buyers they 
service and what price range they offer. By targeting specific buyer market segments and setting 
prices appropriately, they are likely to influence buyer ratings. These decisions are of particular 
significance in generating initial customer ratings, as our analysis suggests that suppliers can improve 
their chances of being selected by influencing both volume and valence of social media signals as 
well as price. In particular, our findings suggest that new suppliers who have yet to establish their 
reputation in an online B2B marketplace should focus on increasing both valence and volume of 
social media signals, but that increasing the volume is even more important than increasing valence. 
This is because many buyers seem to be aware of the “wisdom of the crowd” effect and do not trust a 
valence signal that is not based on a statistically meaningful number of ratings. If forced to trade off 
valence and volume against each other, participants in our experiment 1 would prefer a supplier with a 
lower valence but higher volume of ratings over one with higher valence and a lower volume of 
ratings (as long as valence is not “terrible”, i.e., not below 3.5). From experiment 2, we learned that 
setting a price below the reference price diverts the focus of a buyer away from social media signals 
and increases the likelihood of supplier selection. Thus, in order to increase transaction volume and 
the volume of social media ratings, our findings suggest the new suppliers should set prices below the 
reference price (if feasible with their business strategy, e.g., by offering introductory promotions) until 
reaching a sufficient volume of social media ratings. Once a certain threshold of social media ratings 
has been achieved and the supplier has established a credible reputation online, they can consider 
raising prices to the reference price level. In our experiment, the threshold volume lies between 50 
and 100 ratings.  
Implications for a buyer’s strategy: Feedback from previous buyers can be a useful source of 
additional information for supplier selection. However, if buyers are using social media feedback as 
an input into their decision-making calculus, they should carefully consider the role of the 
marketplace owner in ensuring that these ratings are genuine. Moreover, it seems that buyers already 
intuitively consider the valence of ratings in the context of volume. If a supplier only has few ratings, 
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buyers tend to not give much credence to the valence of these ratings as they do not yet trust this 
signal. Ratings with low volume could be influenced by idiosyncratic preferences of a few buyers or 
even be subject to fraud. Thus, buyers should ensure that they pay attention to both signals and ensure 
a statistically meaningful volume of ratings before taking valence into account. Furthermore, the cycle 
of using social media can only function fruitfully if current buyers leave their own feedback, thus 
contributing to the strength of social media signals of suppliers.  
Implications for market owners: Online B2B markets create value by bringing together large numbers 
of buyers and suppliers and enabling what Kaplan and Sawhney (2000) observed as marketplace 
liquidity: mechanisms to mediate any-to-any transaction at reduced transaction costs. The success of 
online markets, however, depends on the governance mechanisms enforced by the market owner 
aimed at ensuring fair participation in order to facilitate interactions between sellers and buyers. 
Better governance increases the chance to attract large numbers of customers which will also improve 
the market’s performance. Governance mechanisms in online B2B markets can generally include (i) 
monitoring of participants, (ii) community building and (iii) participation in the market (Grewal et al., 
2010). The effectiveness of such mechanisms, however, depends on external demand uncertainty as 
well as the uncertainty faced with regards to the behaviour of the market participants and the 
behaviour of the market owner. While community building seems to be effective under most 
conditions, monitoring and participation seems to be effective for reputable market owners (Grewal et 
al., 2010).  
Given the increasing competition amongst B2B market owners, governance could become a 
differentiating factor. These markets often invite same or similar suppliers that claim very similar 
credentials, certifications, and trade assurances. Buyers therefore prefer markets that can provide 
additional information that is trustworthy in identifying suitable suppliers. For instance, a buyer may 
prefer transactions on one online market over another, regardless of the sellers’ profile due to the 
institutional trustworthiness of one B2B market over another (Pavlou and Gefen, 2004). Therefore, 
one way to differentiate could be the guarantee of genuine social media feedback – especially if it can 
be made more relevant to the buyer. One way to increase the trustworthiness is to only allow “verified 
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buyers” to review the supplier, so that the likelihood of fraud can be reduced. Another way is to work 
with a neutral third-party intermediary, such as Trustpilot or Feefo in the B2C space, to solicit and 
provide buyer reviews.  
7. Conclusion and limitations 
With the emergence of global supply chains and multi-tiered networks of suppliers, buyers face the 
challenge of scaling the supplier selection process without compromising efficiency. Therefore, 
buyers are incentivised to update their supplier-selection approach including new criteria and 
information that allows to improve the process – especially with regards to initial scanning in a global 
marketplace. In this paper, we have shown that such criteria can be social media signals, specifically 
volume and valance of social media feedback that is increasingly being made available on online B2B 
markets. This is an emergent phenomenon in supply chain management in general that is likely to 
have a significant impact on supplier selection practices.  
Even though CBC experimental designs have advantages, they still remain a proxy for 
choices in real purchasing scenarios. Future research is likely to benefit by identifying different 
designs and contexts to test these relationships. We also have not considered the trade-offs between 
social media signals and many of the dominant intentional signals in our analysis. While this was 
done by design, there is scope to consider designs that trade-off intentional and unintentional signals. 
Finally, with more text-based feedback being added in B2B markets, further analysis can be done 
using other types of qualitative social media signals.   
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Figures and tables 
Table 1: Attributes and levels of the CBC experimental design 
 
Attribute 
1 
Attribute 
2 
Attribute 
3 
 Volume Valence Price 
Level 1 10 3.5 £3,000 
Level 2 25 3.7 £2,000 
Level 3 50 3.9 £1,000 
Level 4 100 4.1  
Level 5 250 4.3  
Level 6 500 4.5  
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Table 2: Characteristics of the sample by experiment 
    
Experiment 1: 
Condition One 
printer  
(n = 192) 
Experiment 1: 
Condition Fifty 
printers  
(n = 179) 
Experiment 2: 
One printer and 
price  
(n = 138) 
Purchasing experience    
1 Limited to a few times 41% 44% 38% 
2 Regular 51% 49% 53% 
3 Professional (< 5 years) 5% 6% 6% 
4 Professional (> 5 years) 3% 2% 3% 
Purchasing experience type    
1 Only physical goods 24% 22% 20% 
2 Mostly physical goods 26% 27% 20% 
3 Balance of physical & services 42% 42% 47% 
4 Mostly services 6% 5% 10% 
5 Only Services 3% 3% 2% 
Age     
1 Did not say - - 1% 
2 Less than 25y 18% 1% 20% 
3 25 - 35y 49% 20% 56% 
4 36 - 45y 28% 45% 17% 
5 46 - 55y 4% 25% 4% 
6 56 - 65y 2% 6% - 
7 Over 65y 0% 3% 1% 
Education    
1 High school or less 11% 21% 10% 
2 Bachelors degree (UG) 45% 37% 38% 
3 Trade/ Technical/ Vocational 14% 13% 11% 
4 Masters degree 23% 25% 30% 
5 Professional degree 4% 3% 7% 
6 Doctorate  3% 1% 4% 
Gender    
1 Male 51% 54% 49% 
2 Female 49% 46% 51% 
3 Other (Non-binary) 0% 0% 0% 
Note: Percentages rounded off and may not sum-up to 100%, less than 
0.5% has been rounded off to 0% to indicate responses.  
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Table 3: Relative importance and part-worths for all experiments 
 
 
Experiment 1: One printer 
condition (n = 192)  
Experiment 1: Fifty printers 
condition (n = 179)  
Experiment 2: One printer and 
price (n = 138) 
Attributes 
and levels   
Marginal 
utility 
Standard 
Deviations    
Marginal 
utility 
Standard 
Deviations    
Marginal 
utility 
Standard 
Deviations 
Volume (52.14%)   14.72%  (52.13%)   14.99%  (33.17%)   14.83% 
10 -61.55 - 16.14  -62.54 - 17.18  -58.22 - 27.40 
25 -31.37 2.01 17.49  -30.06 2.17 19.09  -28.28 2.00 22.26 
50 -2.84 1.14 14.89  -0.44 1.18 15.05  -3.57 0.99 19.51 
100 20.90 0.47 11.32  20.87 0.43 11.77  18.34 0.44 15.92 
250 32.13 0.07 13.22  30.44 0.06 12.18  30.45 0.08 18.48 
500 42.73 0.04 18.68   41.72 0.05 19.03   41.28 0.04 23.80 
            
Valence (47.86%)   14.72%  (47.87%)   14.99%  (38.44%)   14.78% 
3.5/ 5.0 -54.46 - 15.78  -54.73 - 16.44  -64.94 - 25.05 
3.7/ 5.0 -30.89 11.79 16.31  -29.81 12.46 15.12  -38.09 13.43 25.56 
3.9/ 5.0 -7.34 11.78 14.91  -6.86 11.48 15.45  -8.67 14.71 21.97 
4.1/ 5.0 21.17 14.26 13.60  20.73 13.80 12.27  23.66 16.17 17.70 
4.3/ 5.0 30.25 4.54 12.19  29.65 4.46 12.48  37.67 7.01 19.02 
4.5/ 5.0 41.27 5.51 19.56   41.01 5.68 19.86   50.37 6.35 24.93 
            
Price         (28.39%)   13.73% 
£1,000         32.90 - 18.10 
£2,000         19.37 -13.53 13.10 
£3,000                 -52.28 -71.65 24.62 
                
            
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are relative importance of attributes. Part-worths are scaled for comparison across levels  
Marginal utility indicates the change in part-worth per unit increase of the attribute. Unit of volume = 1, valence = 1.0, Price = £ 1 
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Table 4: Logit regression coefficients of selecting an alternate supplier over the base option 
supplier with Volume = 75, Valence = 4.0 and Price = £ 2,000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables  Base 
Diminishing 
returns Opposites Deal Size Price 
      
Volume (Unit of 10) 0.047** 0.255** 0.055** 0.047** 0.065** 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Valence (Unit of 0.1) 0.273** 3.780** 0.312** 0.269** 0.452** 
 (0.012) (0.266) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) 
Large deal size (0/1)  -0.057 -0.055 -0.395  
  (0.059) (0.057) (1.017)  
Volume * Volume  -0.004**    
  (0.000)    
Valence * Valence  -0.041**    
  (0.003)    
Valence (3.5) and Volume (500)   -1.194**   
   (0.152)   
Valence (4.5) and Volume (10)   -1.976**   
   (0.158)   
Valence * Large deal size    0.008  
    (0.024)  
Volume * Large deal size    0.000  
    (0.004)  
Price (£ 1000)     4.536** 
     (0.945) 
Price (£ 3000)     1.445 
     (1.126) 
Price (£1000) * Volume     -0.013* 
     (0.004) 
Price (£3000) * Volume     -0.018** 
     (0.004) 
Price (£1000) * Valence     -0.092** 
     (0.023) 
Price (£3000) * Valence     -0.082* 
     (0.026) 
Constant -12.164** -88.016** -13.642** -11.940** -17.895** 
 (0.628) (5.464) (0.661) (0.796) (0.780) 
      
Number of respondents 371 371 371 371 138 
Likelihood ratio (LR) chi-square 698.58** 1329.06** 1002.20** 699.68** 3664.99** 
Degrees of freedom 22 25 25 25 26 
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.155 0.117 0.082 0.273 
            
Standard errors in parentheses      
** p<0.001, * p<0.01     
Coefficients of control variables length of purchasing experience, type of purchasing experience, age of 
respondent, education level, and gender were calculated but not shown. Full results with control variables are 
available upon request. 
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Figure 1: Share of preference of a supplier (supplier 1) against competitor (supplier 2) with fixed characteristics 
 
Notes: Competitor (Supplier 2) characteristics Vol = 250, Val = 3.9, Price = £2,000 
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Figure 2: Share of preference of a new supplier (supplier 1) Vol = 10, Val = 3.9, and Price = £ 2,000 with (a) Changing volume (b) Changing valence 
(c) Changing price, against three competitors (suppliers 2A, 2B, and 2C) 
 
 
Notes: Characteristics of competitors Supplier 2A Vol = 250, Val = 3.7, Price = £2,000; Supplier 2B Vol = 250, Val = 3.9, Price = £2,000; Supplier 2C Vol 
= 250, Val = 4.1, Price = £2,000 
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